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Abstract 
 
I examine Adorno’s controversial claim that human rationality is 
inherently mimetic. To do so, I break this claim down into three 
puzzles (the natural historical puzzle, the metaphysical puzzle, 
and the epistemic puzzle) and consider each in turn. The first 
puzzle originates in Adorno’s assertion that in the course of 
human history the mimetic moment of human thought “is melted 
together with the rational moment”. On his narrative, mimesis 
has become an intrinsic component of human rationality, it 
appears that we are oblivious to this state of affair and unable to 
recognize the workings of mimesis in what we otherwise refer to 
as rationality. The second puzzle concerns the traditional 
metaphysical question regarding the possibility of knowledge. 
Adorno holds that the key to this question lies in the “mimetic 
moment of knowledge”, which he characterizes as the “moment of 
the elective affinity between the knower and the known.” The 
third puzzle concerns his views on how the mimetic moment of 
thought plays out in our epistemic practices. As he puts it, 
“consciousness knows of its other as much as it resembles that 
other,” which seems to entail that our very efforts to 
conceptualize objects somehow rely on imitative processes. I work 
out what I take to be the basics of Adorno’s understanding of 
mimesis and use them to make sense of each puzzle. I argue that 
Adorno’s insistence on the mimetic component of human 
rationality isn’t meant to promote more mimetic modes of 
comportment, but a reflexive awareness of the extent to which 
our rational activities already rely on imitative (or immersive) 
processes, even those we view as embodying the strongest claims 
to the contrary.  
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 IN what follows, I would like to examine a series of puzzles 
that Adorno's concept of mimesis raises. I'm interested in the 
way he uses the concept of mimesis to work out issues 
regarding our understanding of what rationality is about—the 
set of processes it involves, the way it is embodied, and the 
pathologies that may affect it. More precisely, I want to 
understand the role it plays in his critical examination of 
predominant forms of rationality. 
 
One blunt way of putting the problem would be to ask why 
Adorno even considers using the concept of mimesis to 
characterize human rationality, let alone lending such 
importance to it. The reason I put the problem in this way is 
that at the outset it is far from obvious that the concept of 
mimesis can be of any help in clarifying what human 
rationality is about. In fact, many would consider the very idea 
of a mimetic rationality, that is, the idea that what we have 
come to refer to as rationality would rely on imitative 
processes, an oxymoron. Doesn't rationality, in the proper 
sense, begin precisely where mimesis stops—or so goes the 
question?   
 
 From this vantage point, it seems that the only satisfying 
answer to why Adorno gives such weight to the concept of 
mimesis would be that he thinks that he must do so, such that 
without it, defining aspects of human rationality would remain 
unaccounted for. To put the point more broadly: without this 
concept not only would defining aspects of human cognition 
elude us to some extent, but we would also be oblivious to 
essential features of the way norms and codes shape our 
interactions, practices and institutions. If this is accurate, then 
the question is: what exactly can’t we make sense of without 
that concept?  
 The issue is broad and my aim is not to provide a solution 
to the whole of it. Instead, I will break it down into three 
puzzles pertaining to the way Adorno uses the concept of 
mimesis in his characterization of rationality (the natural 
historical puzzle, the metaphysical puzzle, and the epistemic 
puzzle) and examine each in turn to gain some clarity on the 
general issue.  
 
I. The Natural Historical Puzzle  
 
 The first puzzle brings together the phylogenetic 
perspective and the social-historical perspective on the 
development of our mimetic capacity. On the one hand, 
Adorno shares the view that our mimetic capacity belongs to 
the basic set of dispositions that we have acquired in the 
course of our evolution as a species in response a set of natural 
necessities. The primary function of this capacity is thought to 
be that it enables humans to adapt to their environment. On 
the other hand, Adorno claims that in the course of 
enlightenment, our mimetic activity has been profoundly 
altered. As we moved away from the universe of myth, we 
progressively abandoned the practices that most patently 
relied on our imitative abilities, that is, magical and ritualistic 
practices. This points to Adorno’s much-debated claim that in 
the modern world “[a]rt is a refuge for mimetic 
comportment.”1 But the claim I’m interested in hasn’t received 
                                                
1 T.W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans.  Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 53. The list of contributors to this debate is 
extensive. See, for instance, Jay Bernstein’s The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from 
Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), in particular chap. 4-5; 
Christoph Menke’s The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida, 
trans. Neil Solomon (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 1999; and Lambert 
Zuidervaart’s Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press), 1993.  
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as much attention. As Adorno puts it in Negative Dialectics, 
“the mimetic moment is melted together [verschmilzt] with the 
rational moment on the way to its secularization.”2 This can be 
interpreted in various ways. It can be taken to suggest that in 
relying on our cognitive abilities we have developed more 
sophisticated ways of pursuing the same basic imitative 
activities or of pursuing similar imitative activities; or it can 
suggest that we have found new or alternative ways of making 
use of this most basic disposition. However one reads Adorno’s 
statement, the purported melting of the two moments marks a 
transition from a world in which a quite ostensible use of our 
mimetic abilities is made to one in which our self-
understanding is impervious to the mimetic dimension of our 
activities.3 So the first puzzle lies in what Adorno means by 
this merging of the mimetic moment with the rational one. 
 
 I want to propose that Adorno and Horkheimer are already 
trying to make sense of this transition when, in the first 
excursus of Dialectic of Enlightenment on Ulysses, they examine 
the magical and ritualistic mimetic behaviors and contrasts 
them with what is involved in the formation of the self. If we 
follow the main argumentative lines of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, we can distinguish two problems here:  
 
                                                
2 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 45 
(translation altered); Negative Dialektik, in: Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 6, 
(Frankfurt a./M., Suhrkamp, 1973) (hereafter: GS 6),  54 . 
3 As Adorno formulates the claim, the puzzle really is that while this melting together 
of both moments means that mimesis has become a intrinsic part of human 
rationality, we genuinely seem unable to recognize this state of affair and appreciate 
the workings of mimesis in what we otherwise refer to as rationality. In that regard, 
the contrast with the overtly mimetic character of magical and ritualistic practices is 
quite striking.  
 The first problem is how to make sense of our basic 
imitative abilities and of the practices they give way to in the 
universe of myth. Adorno and Horkheimer address this 
problem as they elaborate on the first of the two main theses 
they introduce in the foreword of the book, namely that myth 
is already enlightenment (the second thesis being of course 
that enlightenment reverts into mythology).4 On their 
account, making sense of magical and mythical mimetic 
practices means showing in what way and to what extent these 
practices already are rational. In that regard, their account 
directly challenges the view that rational behavior begins when 
humans depart from primitive modes of behavior. 
 
 The second problem is what becomes of our mimetic 
capacity in the process of enlightenment, as we transition from 
conspicuous forms of mimetic behavior to much more subtle 
ones. This poses the question of how to make sense of the way 
in which the practices we regard as rational somehow extend 
magical and mythical mimetic practices.  
 
 On Adorno and Horkheimer’s view, the key to this 
transition lies in the formation of the self, which they 
articulate through the perplexing idea of a “mimesis of death.”5 
This suggests that an account of their conception of the 
mimesis of death would shed light on the melting together of 
mimesis and rationality and the historical transition it 
constitutes.  
                                                
4 See Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), xviii. 
5 Ibid., 44.  
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Before I go on to explain what is at issue in the idea of a 
mimesis of death, I want to take a closer look at the mimetic 
capacity in question.  
 
 Whereas the claim that we have something like a mimetic 
capacity isn’t controversial, the claim that this capacity would 
pertain to what rational thought is—i.e., to what we have 
come to conceive without any reference whatsoever to 
something like that mimetic capacity—clearly is. So what 
exactly does this capacity consist in? Is it a capacity in the 
proper sense, or something for which we have otherwise 
accurate characterizations (such as sensibility, perception, 
memory, imagination, understanding, etc.)? What is specific to 
it? In short, what does the term mimesis in this context mean 
to capture exactly that no other descriptive adequately 
captures? 
 
 To answer these questions, I believe we ought to highlight 
two features of mimesis. First, if we are to properly recognize it 
as a capacity, alongside our other capacities, it will be as one 
whose complex enactment requires the support of other 
capacities (such as specific modes of attention, imagination, 
and memory) like reflection does, for example. I compare 
mimesis to reflection for a reason. Though the capacity to 
reflect is considered one of the hallmarks of human rationality, 
in many respects it proves just as challenging to determine 
precisely what is involved in what we call reflection as it does 
to determine what mimesis consists in. (Let us note that in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, judgment, understanding, 
imagination, and perception are instrumental to what 
Horkheimer and Adorno refer to as reflection or self-
reflection.6) In both cases, part of the difficulty resides in the 
multifaceted and intricate character of the processes involved. 
  
 The second feature of our mimetic capacity I wish to 
highlight is its relative opacity. The most recent findings in 
developmental psychology tend to confirm the traditional view 
that from the earliest stages of infancy decisive aspects of our 
development rely on our mimetic ability.7 Nevertheless, it 
proves extremely difficult to understand precisely what is 
involved in the child’s mimetic activity. The issue doesn't get 
any simpler when we consider creative artistic processes, for 
example, which since Plato and Aristotle have also been taken 
to involve one form of mimesis or another.8 Adorno himself 
speaks of our “mimetic impulse”9 to capture the spontaneous 
and pre-reflective character of our mimetic activity, which is 
another way of saying that while requiring specific modes of 
attention (and thus being conscious), this activity eludes to a 
certain degree our immediate rational control.10  
                                                
6 See, for example, ibid., 156ff.  
7 See, for example, Michael Tomasello’s The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), in particular chap. 3, 81ff. In 
keeping with a long tradition going back to Aristotle, Adorno claims that “[t]he 
human is indissolubly linked with imitation: a human being only becomes human at 
all by imitating other human beings” (Mimima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged 
Life, trans.  E. F. N. Jephcott (New York: Verso, 2005), §99, 154).  
8 See Plato, The Republic, trans. C.D.C. Reeves (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2004), in particular book 3 and 10; and Aristotle, Poetics, trans. by 
Malcolm Heath, (London: Penguin Classics, 1997), IV, 1448b4-20.  
9 Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1993), 40 (translation altered); Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu 
Hegel, in: Gesammelte Schriften, Volume 5, (Frankfurt a./M.: Suhrkamp, 1970) 
(hereafter GS 5), 285.  
10 Jean-Marie Schaeffer proposes two additional features of our mimetic activity to 
account for its opacity: first, “although the behaviors that they model appear 
regulated, the mental processes that end up constituting models of mimetic 
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 Having said that, we still need to identify what specific 
accomplishment distinguishes our mimetic capacity from 
other capacities. Assuredly, one distinguishing mark of the 
mimetic capacity is what it produces: the imitation itself. In his 
short essay “On the Mimetic Faculty”, Benjamin defines our 
mimetic capacity as the “capacity to produce similarity”11—not 
to recognize similarity, but to produce it. In fact, he goes as far 
as to contend that our ability to recognize similarity “is 
nothing but the remnant of the once powerful compulsion to 
become similar and to behave similarly [ähnlich zu werden und 
sich zu verhalten].”12 In Why Fiction?, Schaeffer develops an 
elaborate conception of our mimetic capacity along similar 
lines. He uses the term mimeme to refer to the relation of 
similarity produced by our imitative behavior. He insists that 
this relation of similarity is a new one in the sense that it “did 
not exist in the world before the mimetic act” and that its 
existence “is caused by this act.”13 On both these accounts, 
then, our mimetic capacity is recognized by the production of 
relations of similarity between what imitates and what is 
imitated.  
                                                                                                 
competence don’t actually comprise the elaboration of rules that would be abstracted 
by induction on the basis of individual cases: they proceed by holistic assimilation of 
exemplifications that are mimed at the motor or imaginative level”; second, “the 
competences acquired mimetically comprise sub-routines of which some aren’t 
cognitively penetrable in the sense that they cannot be detached from the mimeme 
that exemplifies them” (Why Fiction? trans.  Dorrit Cohn (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, 2010), 96 (translation altered); Pourquoi la fiction ? (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 
119).  
11 In Selected Writings, Volume 2: Part 2: 1931-1934, ed. Michael W. Jennings et al., 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 720. 
12 Ibid. (translation altered); Benjamin, Walter, “Über das mimetische Vermögen”, 
in: Gesammelte Schriften, vol. II.1, ed.  Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser, (Frankfurt a./M.: Suhrkamp, 1977), 210.  
13 Why Fiction?,  69. 
 In light of this characterization, I would like to examine 
what is at issue in the idea of mimesis of death. As indicated, 
our capacity to produce similarity is thought to result from our 
evolution as a species. Leaving aside the broad idea that this 
capacity has built-in adaptive features, we can identify two 
necessities that prompt the use of our mimetic capacity:  
 
 First, imitation is a highly efficient way of learning. 
(Imitative learning is also referred to as social learning, 
observational learning, or learning by immersion.) Thus, 
human beings acquire a whole range of basic skills through 
imitation without having to master any explicit rule. From an 
ontogenetic standpoint, this is reflected in the importance of 
imitative learning for the early stages of the child's 
development as it enables the acquisition of the basic tools and 
skills necessary for the ulterior cognitive development of the 
child.14 From a phylogenetic point of view, now, imitative 
learning enables the transmission of skills in the absence of 
sophisticated symbolic medium. Moreover, precisely in that it 
enables the acquisition of the cognitive skills that make 
cultural transmission through symbolic means possible, 
imitative learning is the condition for any cultural 
development.15   
                                                
14 Thus Tomasello claims: “Imitative learning… represents infants’ initial entry into 
the cultural world around them in that they can now begin to learn from adults, or, 
more accurately, through adults, in cognitively significant ways” (The Cultural 
Origins of Human Cognition, 83).  
15 Tomasello makes precisely this point (see The Cultural Origins of Human 
Cognition, chap. 3, p. 81ff.) By contrast, Richard Dawkins defends the radical view 
that cultural transmission too is submitted to natural selection. He coins the term 
meme (short for mimeme and cultural equivalent of gene) to describe units of culture 
differentially replicated through imitation. In so doing, he makes learning by 
imitation the driving force in the evolution of cultures. See The Selfish Gene: 30th 
Anniversary Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chap. 11, 189ff. 
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 Second, the use of our mimetic abilities also responds to 
what has long been considered a constitutive feature of the 
human condition: free agency. The flip side of free agency is 
that knowing what to do and what we are capable of doesn’t 
belong to our natural makeup. In his Second Discourse, 
Rousseau illustrates this point through the fiction of the 
natural man. He imagines that in the state of nature, the prime 
human ethos was developed through the imitation of 
nonhuman animals: “Men, dispersed among [the animals of 
every species], observe, imitate their industry, and so raise 
themselves to the level of the Beasts’ instinct, with the 
advantage that each species has but its own instinct, while man 
perhaps having none that belongs to him, appropriates them 
all, feeds indifferently on most of the various foods which the 
other animals divide among themselves, and as a result finds 
his subsistence more easily than can any one of them.”16  He 
goes on to tell the story of how the development of certain 
dispositions can only be understood as the result a series of 
accidents that have presented mankind with new needs and 
new challenges. As we know, Rousseau has the complex moral 
question of inequality in view. My point is a much simpler one: 
What Rousseau’s tale illustrates is that we are so made that we 
have to make ourselves into something. Whatever capacity we 
prove having, that too is something we discover along the way. 
To do this, it seems, we cannot but imitate; at the very least we 
begin by imitating.  
                                                
16 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among 
Men, in: The Discourses and Other Political Writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 135. To be sure, on Rousseau’s 
account, the need for imitation stems from free agency, as what properly 
distinguishes the human from the animal: “The one chooses or rejects by instinct, the 
other by an act of freedom; as a result the Beast cannot deviate from the Rule 
prescribed to it even when it would be to its advantage to do so, while man often 
deviates from it to his detriment” (140).  
 Let us consider, from this perspective, the question of the 
formation of the modern rational self and the mimesis of 
death that Horkheimer and Adorno take to be one of the keys 
to its formation. What this perspective suggests that for us to 
be rational selves (or subjects in the philosophical sense), we 
have had to make ourselves into these selves. The question 
then is: since knowing what that entails is no more given to us 
than anything else that we strive to know, or to recognize, how 
could we even achieve this? In other words, how was it possible 
for us to make ourselves into such selves, if we neither were 
such selves to begin with nor had a clear enough idea of what 
being a self amounts to? In short, how did we achieve this 
without a model to imitate? The idea that we could somehow 
stumble into being subjects seems just as unlikely as the idea 
that this would be the outcome of careful planning. This poses 
the question of what we find ourselves imitating as we make 
ourselves into subjects. The dramatic-sounding answer that 
Horkheimer and Adorno give is, as mentioned, that it is in 
imitating death that we make ourselves into selves—not just 
in playing dead, but in making ourselves into something at 
least akin to death. 
 
 In the tale of the Odyssey, Adorno and Horkeimer track the 
logic of renunciation. Ulysses renounces his inner drives (his 
needs, his compulsions and desires) in the pursuit of a greater 
goal: the return to Ithaca and what this entails—the 
enjoyment of his wife, his status and his property. In this way, 
he claims to be more than what his own nature prescribes. In 
resisting his natural inclinations (as well as the external 
powers, personified in the mythical figures), the hero 
distinguishes what truly makes him into what he is from his 
own nature. In doing so, he defines himself as that being which 
sets itself apart from all the rest by its own means in order to 
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pursue its own interests, embodied in this one goal: the return 
to Ithaca. The course of Ulysses through myriad dangers is 
presented as a model to understand the formation of the self. 
Of course, Ulysses determines his ultimate goal prior to 
becoming the self that he becomes through his adventures. So 
it is not the fact that he sets a goal for himself that makes him 
the prototype [Urbild] of the self; it's rather the fact that in the 
course of his travels the specific goal that he pursues becomes 
immaterial compared to the fact that he becomes what defines 
itself by the pursuit of its own goals, and what thereby sets 
itself apart from all else by its own means.  
 
 Viewed from what properly characterizes mimesis, namely 
the production of a new relation of resemblance, the logic of 
renunciation not only explains the formation of the self, but it 
also describes the self as that which resembles nothing but 
itself. Here's how I see it: In the chapter on antisemitism, 
Horkheimer and Adorno examine the nature of our mimetic 
activity in more detail. They stress its projective dimension. 
Our mimetic activity is precisely that: an activity. In order to 
produce a mimeme that has some cohesion, we need to 
immerse ourselves in that which we seek to imitate, that is, to 
project ourselves into it in some way. In keeping with this idea, 
it seems that the self is formed though the imitation of the 
projection that is constitutive of the activity of imitation. The 
projection that is inherent to any imitative act becomes the 
organ of the self. As the hero glimpses this projective 
dimension, he immerses himself into it and forms thereby an 
intricately threaded mimeme of this projective dimension, 
thus making himself into that which is defined by that 
element. As Schaeffer argues, the point of imitation isn’t that 
mimemes be absolutely similar to what they imitate. In fact, 
reaching identity is by definition excluded. The relation of 
similarity that is produced is one of selective similarity. Indeed, 
as we immerse ourselves into an object, we seek and retain 
only those traits that are relevant to the production of a 
mimeme, which in turn means that the object itself poses 
constraints to the selection of relevant traits.17 What matters 
here is what the self makes itself into in the process and the 
new self-understanding that is reached this way. For what is 
specific to the self, from this vantage point, is this new 
awareness, a sense that mimesis is nothing but mimesis: the 
business of the self. This would explain Ulysses’ detachment 
from the kind of mimetic behaviors characteristic of the 
mythical universe of his travels and the discovery of his unique 
resources for cunning. It can also explain why having reached 
his goal, he cannot find satisfaction in it. Through his travels, 
he has made himself into this being for whom Ithaca cannot be 
satisfying.  
 
II. The Metaphysical Puzzle  
 
 The next puzzle concerns the traditional metaphysical 
question regarding the possibility of knowledge. Adorno 
discusses this question in a characteristically elliptic manner, 
referring in a variety of ways to the Greek quarrel as to 
whether only the like can know the like,18 which he transposes 
in the question of the affinity between the knower and the 
known. In Hegel: Three Studies, he claims: “If it is true that 
rationality as a whole is the demythologisation of mimetic 
behaviors, then the fact that mimetic motives stay alive in the 
reflection on knowledge cannot come as a surprise; perhaps 
                                                
17 See Why Fiction?,  69f.  
18 See in particular T.W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique: Studies in 
Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies, trans. Willis Domingo, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1982), 143 fn and Negative Dialectics, 56 and 150.  
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not simply as an archaic remnant, but because knowledge itself 
cannot be conceived without the addition of mimesis, however 
sublimated it may be: without it the gap between subject and 
object would be absolute and knowledge would be 
impossible.”19 In a similar vein, he holds in Negative Dialectics 
that the “mimetic moment of knowledge” is “the moment of 
elective affinity between the knower and the known.” Even if 
in the process of enlightenment that moment “gradually 
crumbles”, he contends, it simply can't be eradicated. This 
would mean the end of all knowledge: knowledge would “annul 
itself”,20 as he puts it. In this sense, Adorno suggests that the 
mimetic moment of knowledge has “found refuge in the 
postulate [Postulat]” that we have the “capacity to experience 
the object [Vermögen zur Erfahrung des Objekts].”21  
 
 Fascinating though they may be, these insights leave us 
puzzling over Adorno’s precise meaning. They first raise the 
question of what, exactly, the affinity between the knower and 
the known amounts to in Adorno’s view. Even more puzzling is 
the question of the role he intends mimesis to play in his 
account of affinity. As such, the notion that our knowledge of 
an object implies our relating to that object in some way makes 
a good deal of sense. So if the ties between the knower and the 
known were completely severed, we don't see how it would be 
possible for us to continue relating to the object in any 
meaningful sense. Saying this, however, is not very helpful in 
understanding what Adorno means by our affinity with the 
object. As long as we don't get clearer on this issue, we won't 
                                                
19 Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, 143 fn (translation altered); GS 5, 147 fn.  
20 Negative Dialectics, 45 (translation altered); GS 6, 55.  
21 Ibid.  
really understand in which sense our relation to the object 
could ever be severed.   
 
 On closer examination, it appears that Adorno's claim as 
regards the affinity between the knower and the known can be 
interpreted in at least two ways:   
 
 (1) One can first take him to mean that there is an affinity 
between our capacity to know and what is known by means of 
this capacity and that this affinity is the condition for any 
knowledge. On this reading, our capacity to know belongs to 
our natural dispositions, which means that the affinity 
between our capacity to know and the object itself is natural as 
well. Now, the fact that we are naturally endowed with this 
capacity doesn’t imply that we naturally understand its bounds 
and scope use. Once we do understand them, however, the real 
issue is whether we succeed in making an effective use of this 
capacity within bounds set for its proper use. Kant devotes an 
important part of the Critique of Pure Reason to an inquiry into 
the legitimate use of our capacity to know. As he lays down one 
of the main building blocks of his enterprise in his 
transcendental deduction—the first one, to be sure—, Kant 
makes a distinction between empirical and transcendental 
affinity. He defines the first as the “ground of the possibility of 
the [empirical] association of the manifold, so far as it lies in 
the object ”22 and the second as the “thoroughgoing connection 
under necessary laws” 23 that all possible manifold stand in. 
Because he conceives the categories of the understanding as 
the universal and necessary laws for the synthesis of all 
                                                
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Revised 
Second Edition, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), A113, 139.  
23 Ibid., A114, 140.  
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possible manifold in the transcendental unity of self-
consciousness, he proposes that the former affinity is the 
“mere consequence”24 of the latter. In other words, on Kant’s 
account, what enables us to make any sense whatsoever of 
phenomena is, fundamentally, nothing else than the synthetic 
activity of the transcendental subject, that is, the activity by 
which the manifold is first given the form of what is intelligible 
to the subject.  
 
 In Adorno’s mind, this understanding of the question of 
affinity poses one main problem, which he points out as he 
notes Kant’s “abysmal remark concerning the heterogeneity 
[Ungleichartigkeit] between the pure concepts of the 
understanding and sensible intuition.”25 As Adorno sees it, 
Kant makes this remark in spite of the fact that it creates an 
inconsistency in his system. The problem, in short, is that 
while Kant’s attempt to ground the affinity between the 
subject and the object in the constitutive activity of the 
subject’s transcendental self-consciousness shifts the focus of 
the question of affinity, it doesn’t really answer it. For one can 
always pursue the matter further and ask what the 
transcendental affinity he describes itself relies on. Of course, 
according to Kant, his own critical enterprise shows that any 
attempt at answering this further question is vain, since it 
requires that we step beyond the reach of possible experience. 
In other words, this question is a metaphysical one concerning 
the affinity between the subject and the thing in itself—i.e., 
                                                
24 Ibid. 
25 Against Epistemology, 142-3 (translation altered); GS 5, 147. In this quote, Adorno 
is referring to the chapter on schematism: “But pure concepts of the understanding 
being quite heterogeneous [ungleichartig] from empirical intuitions, and indeed from 
all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any intuition” (Critique of Pure 
Reason, A137/B176, 180). 
the thing as it would appear to a non-discursive, intuitive 
understanding—, which we cannot hope to answer. In 
Adorno’s view, however, this means that Kant puts the 
question of affinity in such terms that it becomes impossible 
for us to gain any clarity on it. 
 
It should be clear that Adorno neither denies that we 
do indeed know objects nor that our capacity to know does 
enable us to know. But saying this sheds no light on the 
question of the affinity between the knower and the known. 
For establishing that we have capacities that each contribute in 
a specific way (and to a specific extent) to our knowledge of 
objects doesn't yet account for the idea that there is an affinity 
between these capacities and the objects we know.  
 
 For my purposes, this understanding of the question of 
affinity poses an additional problem: it leaves unaddressed the 
question of how, on Adorno’s account, the affinity at issue 
somehow involves our imitative capacity. In order to address 
that question, we need to cast the relation of affinity in a 
different way. 
 
 (2) A second interpretation would, instead, argue that the 
affinity between the knower and the known, as Adorno 
understands it, concerns the relation between what is 
subjectively produced in knowledge—which involves concepts, 
of course, but not necessarily just concepts—and what is 
known through it.26 On this reading, affinity would be found in 
the relation of similarity that is created between the knower 
and known, that is, between the knower as it institutes a 
                                                
26 In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno characterizes mimesis as “the non-conceptual affinity 
of the subjectively produced with its unposited other” (53). 
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relation to the object, which, if successful, consists in a relation 
of selective similarity of some kind (however complex and 
sophisticated it may be), on the one hand, and, on the other, 
that which is thereby thought to be known.  
 
 Now this reading raises issues of its own. A first issue is 
what similarity here precisely means. To say that knowledge is 
a constructive activity is an idea we have grown familiar with, 
but to characterize the result of this activity as a network of 
relations of similarity remains quite paradoxical. If we are to 
do more than shift the problem from affinity to similarity, we 
need to get clearer on what such a relation of similarity could 
consist in. In that regard, it would be a mistake to portray 
Adorno as a proponent of the image-theory of representation. 
On that matter, his views are unusually straightforward. In 
fact, Adorno is highly suspicious of any attempt at 
reintroducing the notion that our conceptual representations 
resemble the things they represent or that resemblance of this 
kind between the representation and its object would ground 
the relation of representation. For example, he holds in Against 
Epistemology that “[t]he claim that knowledge or truth would 
be an image of its object is the substitute and the consolation 
for the fact that the like was irreparably torn away from the 
like.”27   
 
 It may also be tempting here to appeal to another of 
Benjamin’s insights to account for Adorno’s view. In “On the 
Mimetic Faculty”, Benjamin describes the kind of similarity we 
produce when we depart from basic forms of imitative 
behavior as "nonsensuous similarities." Thus, we could 
interpret Adorno’s claim that “rationality as whole” is the 
                                                
27 143 (translation altered); GS 5, 148.  
process by which we “demythologize mimetic behaviors”28 in 
Benjamin’s terms: as mimesis is melted together with 
rationality, we no longer produce sensuous (i.e. ostensible) 
similarities but nonsensuous ones. This implies not only that 
the production of these similarities rely on our higher 
cognitive functions, but also that they can only be identified 
and assessed as such through the same abilities.  
 
 This raises a question, though: to what extent does it still 
make sense to speak of similarity here? We can readily agree on 
the fact that our mimetic capacity enables us to produce 
sensuous similarities, inasmuch as we can observe what 
relation binds the imitation to what it imitates. But if the only 
way to make sense of nonsensuous similarities is by analogy 
with sensuous ones, then it would perhaps be best to give up 
the analogy altogether.  
 
 It may be useful at this point to consider how Adorno 
relates to Benjamin’s characterizations of mimesis. Adorno’s 
critical appropriation of Benjamin’s concepts is well 
documented. Though Adorno doesn’t focus on Benjamin’s idea 
of how our mimetic faculty allows for the production of 
nonsensuous similarity, there is no reason to think that his 
criticism of Benjamin wouldn’t apply to that idea as well. 
Adorno rehearses the same point of criticism in a variety of 
forms in the discussions and exchanges he had with Benjamin. 
In essence, he fears that for all their nuance and 
perceptiveness, Benjamin’s interpretations just aren’t 
interpretative enough and enjoins his friend to carry out his 
conceptual interpretations of the material under scrutiny to 
their fullest extent. In particular, Adorno writes a number of 
                                                
28 Against Epistemology: A Metacritique, 143fn (translation altered); GS 5, 147fn.  
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letters to Benjamin,29 in which he expresses concerns for his 
concept of dialectical image. In short, in whatever way 
Benjamin thinks dialectical images are apprehended 
(unconsciously, in a dream, or like a flash in the imagination), 
Adorno rejects any characterization that would liken dialectical 
images to images. The paradox is that to prove an effective 
critical tool, in Adorno’s view, dialectical images should be 
nothing like images. Now, Benjamin’s rather impenetrable 
conception of dialectical images would as such require a 
lengthy treatment, which I cannot provide here.30 The 
important point is this: whatever Adorno has in view in terms 
of similarity falls under his strict prohibition of images.   
 
 This second interpretation of Adorno’s claim on the 
affinity between the knower and the known raises a another, 
more pressing issue concerning the question of truth: How are 
we to conceive of truth after we attempt what appears to be a 
most deflationary move, namely the redescription of the 
question of knowledge in terms of the production of 
something like mimemes? Interestingly, in Hegel: Three Studies, 
Adorno rejects the traditional definition of truth in order to 
reconceive truth in terms of affinity. He claims that “truth is 
not adæquatio but affinity”31—a claim that is bound to remain 
                                                
29 See in particular his letters from May 20, June 5, and August 2-4, 1935, in 
Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928-
1940, ed.  Henri Lonitz, trans. Nicholas Walker, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999, (respectively) 83f.,  93, and 105.   
30 For an overview of Adorno’s relation to Benjamin’s view, see Buck-Morss’ classical 
study The Origins of Negative Dialectics: Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the 
Frankfurt Institute, (New York: Free Press, 1979), chap. 9-10.  
31 40; GS 5, 285. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes: “Affinity is the high point 
[Spitze] of a dialectic of enlightenment. It turns back into blindness, into a 
conceptless execution from the outside as soon as it completely sections affinity. 
Without affinity there is no truth…” (160 (translation altered); GS 6, 276). 
inscrutable until we work out at least the outlines of an 
account of what affinity in this context can mean. Next, I will 
briefly examine whether the idea that the mimetic moment of 
knowledge institutes a relation of selective similarity 
necessarily threatens our core assumptions about truth.  
 
 Think of the way Kant discusses the question of the 
objectivity of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason: if we 
don't possess a criterion that would enable us to establish that 
our knowledge actually corresponds to the object we are trying 
to know, then what can we legitimately make the objectivity of 
our knowledge rely on? The gist of Kant’s Copernican turn 
consists in claiming that the objectivity of knowledge is 
grounded in the universal, yet subjective conditions of 
knowledge. Whereas no criterion allowing us to measure the 
conformity of our knowledge to the object we know can be 
determined apriori, these universal subjective conditions are 
for their part a priori determinable—or so goes his claim.  
 
 So Adorno's suggestion that Kant’s transcendental solution 
leaves the question of affinity unresolved (see above) presents 
us with an alternative. On the one hand, we can try to develop 
a more satisfactory justification for Kant’s transcendental 
strategy. The question then roughly takes the following form: 
how do we account for the fact that the transcendental subject 
constitutes possible experience the way it does and not in any 
other way? What reason do we have to think that this is not 
just the only available way, but the right one? Hegel’s absolute 
idealism can be read as an attempt of this sort.32   
                                                
32 Adorno claims: “[I]n many respect [Hegel] is a Kant come to his own…” (Hegel: 
Three Studies, 6). For an interpretation that focuses on how Hegel proposes an 
answer to the challenges posed by Kant’s transcendental idealism, see, for example, 
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 On the other hand, we can review some of our entrenched 
assumptions concerning objectivity and truth. If the point of 
knowledge is not to achieve adæquatio, because, qua principle, 
we can never establish that we have done so, then it may be 
worth exploring whether affinity better captures what is at 
issue in the idea of truth. The real question here is why Adorno 
thinks that it does.  
 
 To shed some light on that question, I would like to 
examine two sides of Adorno’s conception of truth. Depending 
on how we look at it, it will be viewed as either (1) 
deflationationary or (2) inflationary.  
 
  (1) It seems deflationary when contrasted with the strong 
requirement that truth be the conformity of thought and to its 
object (or correspondence). This requirement is so strong, in 
fact, that, as Kant holds, correspondence can’t be anything but 
a nominal definition of truth. The very idea of deriving a 
universal criterion for truth out of the concept of 
correspondence is contradictory in Kant’s view, since only our 
experience of specific objects (which is always particular) could 
reveal whether our knowledge conforms to those objects.33 
One can read Adorno, then, as registering the excessive 
demand made by this conception on our cognitive faculties and 
proposing instead an understanding of truth that, in his view, 
would be closer to our experience of it. If human knowledge 
proceeds through the production of relations of similarity to 
the objects we seek to know, then it makes sense that we 
wouldn’t require a universal criterion for the truth of our 
                                                                                                 
Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
33 See his Introduction to the Transcendental Logic (Critique of Pure Reason, A 58-
59/B 82-83).  
knowledge. Our ability to assess similarities (even 
nonsensuous ones) enables us to determine whether and to 
what extent we succeed in producing the required relations of 
similarity.  
 
 Drawing a parallel with Hegel’s discussion of the criterion 
of knowledge in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 
is enlightening here. In short, Hegel contends that we needn’t 
look beyond consciousness itself to find a criterion for 
knowledge: consciousness is this criterion. To determine 
whether we accurately conceive of something, all that is 
available to us is the objet, on the one hand, and our 
understanding of it, on the other. To test the accuracy of our 
conceptions, what is required is that we measure our 
understanding of the object against the object itself. But since 
we don’t have any direct, unmediated access to objects, we 
must rely on our understanding of the objects to proceed. So 
we end up measuring our understanding of the object against 
itself, that is, we probe and reflect on our understanding until 
we can be satisfied with it.34  
 
 Now, as we know, Hegel defends that this ceaseless process 
of self-reflection is constitutive of consciousness. Whereas in 
Hegel, as Adorno notes, consciousness’ constitutive striving 
towards a satisfactory understanding provides the momentum 
for the elaboration of the system,35 Adorno himself emphasizes 
the striving. As he sees it, what drives thought is the 
                                                
34 See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 1997, §84-85, 53.  
35 See, amongst other passages, Hegel: Three Studies, 6: “Hegel… is driven by the idea 
that knowledge, if there is such a thing, is by its very idea total knowledge, that every 
one-sided judgment intends, by its very form, the absolute, and does not rest until it 
has been sublated in it.”  
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experience of its own inadequacy in face of the object. 
Thought, he claims, “must aim beyond its target just because it 
never quite reaches it.”36 From this standpoint, it seems that it 
would be our striving to get it right taken against our 
experience of dissatisfaction and failure that leads Adorno 
towards affinity. Thought must take “its own inadequacy more 
thoroughly into account.”37 So a productive way of construing 
Adorno’s conception of truth might be as an attempt to make 
us more attentive to this inadequacy so that we better 
appreciate the measure of similarity and dissimilarity in 
thought’s relation to its object.  
 
 (2) But Adorno’s conception of truth can be also viewed as 
inflationary, if we consider that, as mentioned, truth as 
correspondence is a merely nominal, or formal, conception of 
truth. Indeed, from this standpoint, Adorno’s own conception 
appears to express both the limitation of truth as 
correspondence and the demand that truth be a more 
substantive concept than correspondence can ever be.  
 
 In fact, in his Meditations on Metaphysics, Adorno 
distinguishes two moments in the idea of truth: “the excess 
over the subject” [Überschuß übers Subjekt] and “the moment of 
truth in thingliness”38 [Wahrheitsmoment am Dinghaften]. 
However perplexing this new claim may seem, it should be 
clear that Adorno is not proposing that we could somehow find 
a way out of, or beyond, the subject’s conceptual means in 
order that we may come to reach the thing itself, as it were. In 
                                                
36 Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, (New 
York: Verso, 2005), § 82, 127; GS 4, 144.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Negative Dialectics, 385 (translation altered); GS 6, 368. 
fact, Adorno is adamant that we must strive “through the 
concept to reach beyond the concept [über den Begriff durch den 
Begriff hinauszugelangen].”39 Behind his colorful prose, there 
simply lies Adorno’s attempt at revealing what is at issue in our 
deep-seated assumptions about truth and working out, in light 
of this, a more consistent understanding of how it is possible 
to meaningfully engage with the objects we seek to know. Our 
understanding of truth must move between the two poles, he 
explains, for “[t]here would be no more idea of truth without 
the subject who must wrest itself from appearance [Schein] 
than without that which isn’t subject and on which truth is 
modeled.”40 So recognizing thought’s own shortcomings and 
striving to overcome them are in his view two sides of the 
same coin.  
 
 As outlined, Adorno’s conception of truth testifies to his 
awareness of the normative dimension of our claims to truth 
and, even more so, of our understanding of truth. This means 
that what we hold truth to be is defining not only for the kind 
of epistemic practices we can recognize as legitimate ones, but 
also for ones we will view as more rigorous, thorough and 
substantive—in a word: objective. What I take Adorno to be 
saying is that a conception of truth is pointless unless it 
enables us to understand how to better equip and orient our 
epistemic practices so that they may be more objective. If, as 
he stresses, knowledge is an activity, one that, moreover, 
unfolds amidst a complex set of well-defined epistemic 
practices, then our ability to reach objects depends as much on 
our understanding of how the practices we already are engaged 
in are defined to some extent by epistemological norms (albeit 
                                                
39 Ibid., 15 (translation altered); GS 6, 26.  
40 Ibid., p. 385 (translation altered); GS 6, 368.  
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implicit ones) as on the understanding of what is required for 
their reshaping to actually occur. So far from expressing his 
relinquishment of any substantial claims to truth, Adorno’s 
conception of truth as affinity means to take us a few steps 
towards the reevaluation of important features of our 
epistemic practices.  
 
To return to the puzzle, now, how does mimesis enable 
us to understand the affinity between the knower and the 
known? On the reading I have been proposing, Adorno doesn’t 
mean that our knowledge of object is made possible by some 
prior affinity between the knower and the known. Nor does he 
claim to have found a way of bridging an unbridgeable gap. 
Instead, what he means is that the point of knowledge is to create 
the affinity between the subject and its object. If my reading is 
accurate, we should look for how this affinity is produced in 
the activity of the subject as it threads a web of mimemes, 
which leads me to my last puzzle.  
 
III. The Epistemic Puzzle 
 
 I present that puzzle as an epistemic one because it directly 
concerns the inner workings of mimesis as a moment of 
knowledge. As such, the idea that knowledge has a mimetic 
moment appears quite puzzling, particularly if by “mimetic 
moment” we understand, as I have thus far, the production of 
a relation of selective similarity. There is something odd about 
the idea that our efforts to conceptualize objects rely to some 
extent on the production of mimemes, or to put the point in 
more striking terms, that knowing objects somehow requires 
that we behave imitatively. Yet Adorno holds that  
“[c]onsciousness knows of its other as much as it resembles 
that other; it does not know its other by crossing itself out 
along with resemblance.”41  
 
 To establish the plausibility of Adorno’s view and work out 
what I take to be at issue in this third puzzle, I want to briefly 
examine Dreyfus’ six-stage theory of learning. A core 
contention of Dreyfus is that immersion is the key to one’s 
progression towards the higher stages of learning. For my 
purpose, the point is that what Dreyfus terms immersion is 
otherwise referred to as imitative learning. To be sure, he uses 
both characterizations.42 Dreyfus’ theory of learning draws on 
his work on Heidegger’s existential analysis of Dasein’s 
everydayness (and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
description of embodiment, though I will focus on his 
Heidegger interpretation).  
 
 On Heidegger’s analysis, our primary mode of being isn’t 
that of a detached self, occupied with finding out what things 
truly are or deliberating on the reasons for her actions. 
Instead, Heidegger claims that we are always already immersed 
in a world. World is the operative term for the basic frame of 
meaningfulness in which the things we encounter are disclosed 
to us. Indeed, according to him, in our everyday dealings the 
meaning of what we encounter is disclosed from within the 
whole set of projects and activities we are engaged in. As a 
                                                
41 Negative Dialectics, 269 (translation altered); GS 6,267.  
42 Dreyfus discusses his theory in various essays. I mainly rely on the version of that 
theory he presents in On the Internet 2ed., (New York: Routledge, 2009), chap. 2, 
where he adds a sixth stage (mastery) to the previous list of five (novice, advanced 
beginner, competence, proficiency, and expertise). Compare for instance “From 
Socrates to Expert Systems: The Limits of Calculative Rationality” (1985), in: Skillful 
Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action, ed.  Mark A. 
Wrathall, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 25-46.  
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result, the things we come upon are not objects in the sense of 
what is offered to the consideration of a subject, but so many 
tools seamlessly integrated in our activities. For example, it is 
what we use the hammer for in our projects that discloses the 
meaning of the thing we encounter as a hammer. Moreover, it 
is in this mode of being engaged in projects and activities that 
we develop the aptitudes and dispositions—“skills” in Dreyfus’ 
terminology—that allow us to smoothly transition from one 
context to next and so to move across our everyday world. To 
describe our everyday situated engagement in activities 
Dreyfus coins the phrase skillful coping.  
 
 Now, as we go about our daily business, our situated 
understanding remains for the most part implicit. For skillful 
coping to effectively go on, in Dreyfus’ sense, the activities we 
are engaged in, the skills they require and the specifics of what 
we encounter in the course of those activities needn’t be made 
explicit, much less articulated in reasons. If, at any moment, 
one aspect or another of our activities requires a more 
thorough scrutiny, it is from our very situatedness that it will 
be elicited and examined. As Dreyfus sees it, this doesn’t 
preclude our taking some distance from our actual engagement 
and to reflect in a more detached manner at the nature of our 
activities, challenges we face, and possible solutions to these 
challenges. But in keeping with Heidegger’s analysis, he insists 
that the adoption of the detached stance required to both 
theoretically engage with objects and to deliberate on the 
reasons and justifications for our actions (which has received 
so much philosophical attention) is a derived mode of 
engagement in the world. It is achieved through a modification 
of the primary mode of skillful coping, characterized by a pre- 
or nonconceptual understanding, as opposed to the conceptual 
understanding of our various modes of theorizing.  
 This conclusion allows Dreyfus to highlight what he views 
as a fundamental discrepancy in our understanding of the 
learning process. In his mind, the stress that has been put on 
the appropriation of concepts and rules stands in direct 
opposition to the way we actually learn. From novice (first 
stage) to advanced beginner (second stage), teaching explicit 
rules and specific tokens of information makes a good deal of 
sense because they provide a baseline upon which further 
learning becomes possible. But as we advance towards the 
higher stages of learning, breaking down the knowledge and 
skills to be acquired into explicit rules and information 
transmissible from teacher to pupil grows increasingly 
burdensome and ineffective. Dreyfus locates the threshold of 
higher learning somewhere between competence and 
proficiency (respectively, the third and fourth stages), as the 
pupil’s progression demands an increasing level of personal 
commitment and of direct involvement with her teacher. As he 
sees it, the competent learner is soon confronted with an 
overwhelming quantity of information to sieve through and 
orientations to choose from. This forces her to make strategic 
decisions in approaching problems. Doing so entails taking 
risks and facing the outcome of her decisions, which in turn 
means dealing with the emotional dimension of the process. 
The experience of fear, pressure, and anxiety, the 
disappointment of failure and the satisfaction of success thus 
become a crucial part of the learning process. Emulation of the 
teacher and retroaction are necessary to learning how to make 
the right decisions and to deal with their consequences.  
 
 As we draw near expertise (fifth stage), Dreyfus contends, 
the rules and patterns to be appropriated become so complex 
and the information to be integrated so tightly interwoven 
with these patterns that the only way forward is through 
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immersion into these intricate patterns as they take shape in 
the practice of the master (sixth stage). Whatever the field of 
study, expert learners take on the role of apprentices whose 
close proximity to their master allows for just this kind of 
immersion into her style—Dreyfus’ term for the whole set of 
perspectives, intuitive responses, and accompanying actions 
that define the practice of the master. “Even where the subject 
matter is purely theoretical”, Dreyfus contends, 
“apprenticeship is necessary.”43 Whether in carpentry or in 
research, the aim of apprenticeship is to develop a sense of 
what the appropriate response to a complex problem is, 
without having to justify this response with reasons. On 
Dreyfus’ view, the ability to intuitively find the appropriate 
way of coping is the mark of expertise and mastery alike—
mastery chiefly differs in the wealth and originality of the 
perspectives and accompanying actions intuitively available to 
the master.  
 
 I want to draw on Dreyfus’ analysis to make two points 
concerning Adorno’s understanding of the role of mimesis in 
our epistemic practices. My first point is that, on Adorno’s 
account, the claims that Dreyfus formulates as regards higher 
learning apply to any cognitive practice. Indeed, Dreyfus’ 
analysis suggests, against the prevailing view, that the higher 
cognitive functions whose exercise we commonly associate 
with expertise and mastery are in fact required precisely for 
the successful immersion into patterns, whose complexity far 
exceeds what our reflexive ability can effectively process.44 In 
fact, it seems that the more complex and sophisticated the 
                                                
43 Dreyfus, On the Internet, 38.  
44 Compare Benjamin’s statement: “There is perhaps not a single one of [man’s] 
higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role” (“On the 
Mimetic Faculty”, 720). 
skills, the more we need to rely on immersive processes to 
appropriate them. This point needn’t be restricted to 
theoretical complexity, though it appears particularly clear in 
the case of the appropriation of intellectual and scientific 
skills. Dreyfus suggests that, “in the sciences, postdoctoral 
students work in the laboratory of a successful scientist to 
learn how their disembodied, theoretical understanding can be 
brought to bear on the real world. By imitating the master, they 
learn abilities for which there are no rules, such as how long to 
persist when the work does not seem to be going well, just how 
much precision should be sought in each different kind of 
research situation, and so forth. In order to bring theory into 
relation with practice, this sort of apprenticeship turns out to 
be essential.”45 By contrast, while Adorno thinks that the 
emulation of experienced researchers and the immersion into 
their practices is indeed necessary for young researchers to 
learn how their previously acquired theoretical knowledge can 
“bear on the real world”, he also thinks that they are necessary 
to acquire any theoretical knowledge in the first instance.46  
Regardless of how one may view one’s theoretical practices, in 
Adorno’s view, they are, in a way or another, already embodied, 
that is, they belong to an existing set of more or less well-
defined intellectual or scientific practices. This means that one 
cannot display the theoretical knowledge without having 
appropriated, through immersion, the patterns that support 
this knowledge. What is more, it is not clear that one could 
ever achieve this kind of immersion without the support of a 
                                                
45 Dreyfus, On the Internet, 38 (my emphasis).  
46 It strikes me as odd that, given his own views on learning, Dreyfus doesn’t take this 
further step. One reason for this might be that doing so would force him to attenuate 
his views on the essentially non-conceptual, intuitive character of the understanding 
at play in the expert’s and the master’s practices. I discuss the question in what 
follows.  
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substantial capacity for abstraction and formalization and of at 
least some level of conceptual imagination.  
 
 Adorno’s insight into the “unredeemable moment of 
mimesis in all knowledge”47 should, I take it, be read along the 
same lines. Indeed, for Adorno, the real issue isn’t whether or 
not our cognitive practices do rely on imitative processes, but 
that in the course of the enlightenment we have grown 
oblivious to the fact that they do. As I see it, the assumption 
that Dreyfus debunks as the myth of the mental, namely that 
“all intelligibility, even perception and skillful coping, must be, 
at least implicitly, conceptual,”48 is roughly equivalent to what 
Adorno understands as the priority of the subject (or identity 
thinking) in his broadly construed understanding of idealism. 
Adorno, too, holds that this assumption in fact blinds us to the 
role that our imitative activity invariably plays in our cognitive 
practices.  
 
 That said, the line separating Dreyfus’ account from 
Adorno’s is perhaps still sharper than I have drawn it so far—
which leads me to my second point. Contrary to Dreyfus (and 
Heidegger), Adorno does not propose that we recognize our 
reliance on immersive processes in order that we may better 
attune to them. Instead, he thinks that the fact that we have 
grown oblivious to this reliance is highly problematic since it 
prevents us from recognizing the kind of self-reflection 
necessary to make the mimetic component of our cognitive 
practices explicit and to reveal defining features of the frames 
                                                
47 Negative Dialectics, 150; GS 6, 153.  
48 Dreyfus, “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit 
from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise” (2005), in Skillful Coping: Essays on 
the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action, ed. Mark A. Wrathall, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 110.  
of intelligibility that we appropriate by immersion, and in 
which our cognitive practices unfold.  In other words, for 
Adorno, the problem is our inability to acknowledge our reliance on 
immersion.  
  
O’Connor compellingly argues that while Dreyfus 
makes a strong case for a more embodied understanding of 
thought and agency, his claim that that our familiar ways of 
engaging in practices is non-conceptual throughout introduces 
a separation between the space of action and the space of 
reason that is misleading.49 I would add that, from Adorno’s 
standpoint, Dreyfus’s claim appears both descriptively and 
normatively misleading. First, descriptively: Of course, if we 
maintain a view of our conceptual practices as proceeding from 
a detached, disembodied standpoint, then the notion that 
articulated reasons, explicit rules and most conceptual matters 
are absent from our everyday practices makes a good deal of 
sense. But once we renounce this view, and resituate our 
conceptual practices in the social space in which they unfold, it 
becomes, perhaps, easier to acknowledge, as Adorno does, that 
these practices are, if not entirely construable in conceptual 
terms, then at least to an important degree conceptually 
layered. So Adorno’s claim isn’t that our everyday practices are 
non-conceptual, but that they are far from being just 
conceptual. (The point has a tremendous critical significance 
for Adorno who strives to reveal aspects of the non-conceptual 
that are defining for our practices but that we are blind to.) 
Second, Dreyfus’ claim also appears normatively misleading: 
Of course, from his standpoint, Adorno’s insistence may well 
amount to reintroducing a cognitivist bias in our 
                                                
49 See Brian O’Connor,  “The Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise and the 
Emancipatory Interest,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, 39, no. 9 (2013): 930.  
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understanding of human practices. In Adorno’s view, however, 
the fact that no comprehensive reconstruction of the expert’s 
practices (in terms of explicit rules, justified reasons and 
tokens of knowledge) can be achieved in no way implies that 
experts shouldn’t strive to articulate their knowledge and to 
become more self-conscious of why their take on complex 
issues is and should be regarded as the appropriate one.50 
Moreover, if it is true that, through immersion, “children begin 
to learn to be experts in their culture’s practices from the 
moment they come into the world,”51 as Dreyfus suggests, then 
short of promoting more reflexive modes of engagement (some 
indeed implying a more theoretical stance, though not 
necessarily a detached one), a great deal of the conceptual 
                                                
50 O’Connor’s discussion of Dreyfus’ example of the master chess player is interesting 
in that regard. Dreyfus views the prowess of grandmasters in bullet games as a clear 
indication that their command of the game really does rely on the immense array of 
perspectives intuitively available to them. As O’Connor notes, however, grandmasters 
also play tournament games where, time providing, they show much more 
circumspection and spend considerable energy in carefully analyzing their moves (at 
least in the later stage of the game), which leads him to propose that “it is not a mark 
of expertise that it is always absorbed and non-deliberative” (“The Phenomenology of 
Everyday Expertise and the Emancipatory Interest,” 929). To be fair, Dreyfus admits 
of deliberation in the grandmaster’s chess practices, as in the practice of any master, 
for that matter. In fact, he distinguishes two kinds of deliberation the master engages 
in, none of which, in his view, requires the adoption of a detached stance, quite the 
contrary. On the one hand, the master can consciously decide to override 
conventional expertise and to improve his skill by looking “for opportunities to excel 
that are invisible to experts” (On the Internet, 41). On the other hand, she can reflect 
on her response to novel situations and deliberate as to what would have been a 
better course of action. In both cases, what Dreyfus refers to as deliberation is 
prompted by the depth of the master’s engagement in his practice and aims at 
enhancing the range of intuitive perspectives at her disposal. Perhaps the problem 
here has to do with how one interprets what it means for a practice to be conceptual, 
or conceptually informed. O’Connor’s criticism suggests that Dreyfus holds on to a 
narrowly-defined understanding of conceptuality, one that Adorno would certainly 
object to.  
51Dreyfus, On the Internet, 44.  
efforts that have gone into the elaboration of some of the 
defining practices that characterize our culture would be left 
unexamined. In addition, because of the way in which these 
practices are appropriated, we risk growing even blinder to 
some assumptions that have shaped these practices, as they 
come to be seamlessly integrated into the very fabric of these 
practices and become, thereby, unavailable to scrutiny. 
Assumptions of this sort include, Adorno thinks, the 
assumption that modern rational practices have nothing to do 
with mimesis.  
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
 On my reading, Adorno’s insistence on the mimetic 
moment of human rationality isn’t meant to promote more 
mimetic modes of behavior and cognitive activity, but an 
awareness of the extent to which our practices already rely on 
imitative processes, even in spheres we tend to regard as 
embodying the strongest claims to the contrary.   
 
One could object that even after we dismiss the 
assumptions grouped under the myth of the mental, and 
recognize, in line with Dreyfus’ analysis, that immersion is an 
integral part of sophisticated cognitive practices, Adorno’s 
claim that mimesis is a key component of any knowledge 
remains contentious. Arguably, Dreyfus’s analysis allows us to 
make sense of the paradoxical idea that our higher cognitive 
functions are required for the kind of immersive processes 
involved in the development of complex skills, in the way I 
have indicated, but one could contend that his focus remains 
on skills (knowing-how), and not so much on knowledge per se 
(knowing-that). So how does drawing on his views enable us to 
account for Adorno’s claim that consciousness knows as much 
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of an object as it makes itself similar to it? Challenges of this 
kind are likely to abound until we reach clearer insights into 
precisely how Adorno thinks our mimetic abilities play out in 
knowledge (including self-knowledge). In that regard, Adorno’s 
elliptic claims persistently frustrate our demands for 
clarification. Nevertheless, I would like to sketch out an answer 
to this challenge by distinguishing three aspects in Adorno’s 
reflection.   
 
 First, Adorno seeks to reveal the immersive processes 
involved in our appropriation of cognitive practices at large. 
The second aspect consists in showing, against the epistemic 
self-understanding that obtains, that our conceptual activity 
does rely on imitative processes even when we take ourselves 
to be doing something diametrically opposed to mimesis—
forming concepts, judging whether an object instantiates a 
concept, formulating propositions, making inferences, and the 
like. The last aspect focuses on the role of immersion in the 
kind of reflexive and self-reflexive conceptual practices that 
Adorno furthers. The first aspect is what I believe my Adornian 
take on Dreyfus’ insights roughly enable us to make out. So I 
will focus here on the second and third aspects.  
 
 As regards the second aspect, the point is that our 
articulation and formulation of concepts relies on immersive 
processes similar to the ones to which Dreyfus refers regarding 
the appropriation of skills. Simply put, in order to conceive of 
something we need to focus our attention on the object at 
hand so as to more or less completely immerse ourselves into 
it. The way immersion works is through the projection of our 
understanding in such a way that we spontaneously produce 
and map out more or less broad patterns of intelligibility (a 
still loosely defined set of selective relations of similarity), 
depending on the complexity of our object. These patterns 
remain inchoate until we begin working them out in 
conceptual terms. The formation of conceptual 
representations proceeds through the reflexive isolation and 
extraction of patches of meaning from within these patterns 
(as we immerse ourselves in objects). In giving stability and 
cohesion to these patches of meaning we reach what we refer 
to as conceptual representations, through which the content of 
such patches becomes available for scrutiny. In turn, working 
out conceptual representations enables us to give the same 
kind of stability and cohesion to the patterns of intelligibility 
from which these representations are first extracted. In this 
way, we can progressively build larger and more cohesive 
frames of intelligibility. The result is that we can navigate with 
relative ease in the frames we have created, using conceptual 
representations as landmarks.  
 
 According to Adorno, the focus of modern epistemology 
has been on whatever meaning we’ve already succeeded in 
articulating into concepts and on the cognitive processes that 
rely on readily available concepts. As a consequence, the 
immersive processes that make these further cognitive 
processes possible have fallen to the margin of our 
epistemological purview, which has made us unable to 
appreciate the cognitive dependency of our representations on 
the prior patterns produced through immersion.  
 The third aspect of Adorno’s reflection expounds on this 
conclusion. He acknowledges that the bulk of our cognitive 
efforts aren’t devoted to forming concepts. In fact, most of the 
time, as we engage in epistemic practices, we move in a 
cognitive space defined by representations we’ve acquired and 
appropriated through symbolic means. However, as long as we 
remain within that space and use the representations at our 
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disposal to fuel our cognitive activity, we limit our grasp of 
objects to whatever intentional content is readily available to 
us through them. To be sure, Adorno’s point isn’t that we 
should try to restore or recreate the elemental patterns of 
intelligibility out of which our concepts were first created. 
Instead, I take him to mean that we ought to use conceptual 
representations to initiate new immersive processes.52 
Reflection and self-reflection, as he understands them, are 
processes geared towards reigniting our conceptual 
representations, so as to make their strictly defined bounds 
porous again and to open up in this way patterns of meaning 
not otherwise available.  
 
 Two aspects of this process need to be underscored: First, 
this new immersion into the object is not the end point of the 
process. Adorno unambiguously asserts that the interpretative 
process he describes in terms of constellations, or trial 
conceptual arrangement, operates in the medium of 
conceptual representation. So what this kind of immersion 
into the object really aims at is a thorough conceptualization 
the object. But he also thinks that the notion that 
conceptualization would amount to moving from one 
representation to next in chains of inferences simply doesn’t 
capture what, on his account, our reflection-driven immersive 
processes enable us to do. The second aspect is yet more 
                                                
52 Relying on Adorno’s claim pertaining to the role of language in such immersive 
processes (“only as language can the like know the like” [nur als Sprache vermag das 
Ähnliche das Ähnliche zu erkennen]”, Negative Dialectics, 56 (translation altered); GS 
6, 65), Jay Bernstein proposes the following view: “[R]hetorical statements orient our 
attention away from the inferential commitments implied by the bald assertoric 
version and toward the matter of the judgment itself, they inflect the statement 
towards its own emphatic—experiential—content” (“Mimetic Rationality and 
Material Inference: Adorno and Brandom,” Revue internationale de philosophie, 63, 
no. 1 (2004): 17).  
striking: Clearly, the point of this process isn’t simply to 
trigger immersive processes that would deliver new, more 
accurate and more substantial concepts. If my interpretation is 
correct, the point rather is to produce in this way what I have 
referred to as a mimeme of the object, but a conceptual one. 
That concepts could be used to form such mimemes is a point 
that is bound to remain controversial. Yet Adorno claims that 
“[t]he concept can only take on the affair of what it 
suppressed, mimesis, in that it adopts something of mimesis in 
its own conducts, without loosing itself to it.”53 His trial 
conceptual arrangements, then, should be viewed a way of 
threading concepts together so as to produce a conceptual 
model of the object, one Adorno thinks enables us to reveal 
features of an object that were previously unavailable to 
scrutiny and, thus, to discover what that object really is 
about.54 By all accounts, this is a tough point to sell, but I 
believe that interpreting Adorno in this way might help us in 
unlocking his unconventional views on the “mimetic essence”55  
of human rationality.56  
 
  
                                                
53 Negative Dialectics, 14 (translation altered); GS 6, 26. 
54 Compare Schaeffer’s claim: “when I construct a mimeme, I reach at the same time 
a knowledge of what I imitate: to the extent that the construction of an imitation is 
selective with respect to the properties of the imitated thing, it is, ipso facto, a tool of 
intelligence of this imitated thing.” He insists: “the construction of an imitation is 
always a way of knowing the imitated thing” (Why Fiction?, 68). 
55 Hegel: Three Studies, 40.  
56 My thanks go to the following people for their very helpful questions and 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper: William Buschert, Eric Dayton, Fabian 
Freyenhagen, Lydia Goehr, Espen Hammer, Owen Hulatt, Kathy Kiloh, Iain 
Macdonald, Christoph Menke, Brian O’Connor, Gérard Raulet, Daniel Regnier, 
and Martin Shuster.  
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